

Competition, R&D and innovation: testing the inverted-U in a simultaneous system

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- Theoretical background
- Data
- Structural model
- Empirical findings
 - Dynamic adjustment
- Policy conclusions
- Annex



How does competition affect innovation?

- Schumpeter (1911, 1942)
 - Incompatibility of endogen. innovation and perfect competition
 - Negative impact (at high levels of competition)
- **Arrow** (1962)
 - Positive impact (at low levels of competition)
- Kamien-Schwarz (1976)
 - Innovation race with effort depending on number of rivals, demand growth, post-innovation rents, etc.
- Vast game theoretic literature: 'anything goes'
- Aghion et al (2005)
 - Pre- vs post innovation rents, composition effect
 - Triggered much new empirical analyses




- Swiss Innovation Survey by KOF-ETH
- Unbalanced firm panel observed across five periods
- Stratified random sample (firms > 5 employees) in the manufacturing, construction, and service sectors

Year	Number of firms	Response rate
1994/1996	1748	32.5%
1997/1999:	2172	33.8%
2000/2002:	2583	39.6%
2003/2005:	2555	38.7%
2006/2008:	2141	36.1%

> Econometric estimations are based on 8,656 observations!



Competition – Effort (R&D) – Innovation




- \triangleright Innovation opportunity function (C \rightarrow E)
- \triangleright Innovation production function $(E \rightarrow I)$
- \triangleright Innovation impact function (I → C)




Adding control variables

- Technological potential
- Demand growth
- Capital intensity
- Human capital
- Firm size
- Firm age
- Exports
- Foreign ownership
- Industry & time effects





Identify exogenous instrumental variables



- Technological regimes at the EU sector level
 - > **Opportunity conditions**
 - Cumulativeness of knowledge
 - > Appropriability conditions



Simultaneous system of three equations

(1)
$$E_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 C_i + \theta_1 C_i^2 + \gamma_1 X_i + \delta_1 O_j + v_{1i}$$

(2)
$$I_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 E_i + \gamma_2 X_i + \delta_2 M_j + v_{2i}$$

(3)
$$C_i = \alpha_3 + \beta_3 I_i + \gamma_3 X_i + \delta_3 A_j + v_{3i}$$

- 3SLS method; instruments pass overidentification, underidentification and weak instrument tests
- Robustness checks: traditional 2SLS; ordered probit; no sector dummies; endogenized squared term; more time varying instruments; panel with lag structure
- Robust relationships among endogenous variables!




Innovation opportunity function

Independent variables	Total sample		Creative firms		Adaptive firms	
	Coef.		Coef.		Coef.	
$\overline{\mathbf{C_i}}$	2.2038	***	6.3907	***	1.7355	***
•	(0.5011)		(1.1993)		(0.4195)	
C _i squared	-0.4426	***	-1.2892	***	-0.3419	***
_	(0.0969)		(0.2344)		(0.0802)	
${tp_i}$	0.0906	***	0.1043	***	0.0593	***
-	(0.0092)		(0.0185)		(0.0098)	
hc _i	0.0254		0.0910	*	-0.0263	
-	(0.0265)		(0.0510)		(0.0281)	
$\overline{\mathbf{g}_{\mathrm{i}}}$	0.0337	***	0.0428	**	0.0418	***
	(0.0106)		(0.0197)		(0.0121)	
$\overline{\mathbf{g}_{\ \mathbf{i}}^{\mathbf{e}}}$	0.0781	***	0.1336	***	0.0323	**
•	(0.0120)		(0.0228)		(0.1293)	
S _i small	-0.1527	***	-0.0784		-0.0871	**
•	(0.0359)		(0.0738)		(0.0400)	
S _i med	-0.1341	***	-0.2259	***	-0.0267	
_	(0.0364)		(0.0657)		(0.0422)	
Si very large	0.1433	***	0.2301	***	0.1081	**
-	(0.0408)		(0.0752)		(0.0468)	
$\overline{\mathbf{O_i}}$	0.1958	***	0.1744	***	0.0913	*
	(0.0407)		(0.0238)		(0.0470)	
No Obs.	8,656		4,513		4,143	




Creative vs adaptive regimes






Dynamic adjustment






Change in exogenous variables (1)






Change in exogenous variables (2)





Change in exogenous variables (3)





- Impact of competition on innovation follows an inverted-U shape
 - Highest innovation at intermediate levels of competition, but little innovation if monopoly or very high competition
- Creative entrepreneurs are more sensitive to changes in competition than adaptive firms
- Possible solutions to the model
 - [Uncontested monopoly with no or low innovation]
 - Low competition & high innovation
 - High competition & low innovation (unstable)
 - Very high competition & no innovation



- Individual outcomes depend on *regime-*, *industry-*, and *firm* specific characteristics (heterogenous intercepts)
- For the average firm, we observe that
 - Demand growth, technology potential, firm size and exports increase innovation effort and outcome, while leaving competition largely unaffected
 - Foreign ownership tends to decrease innovation, mainly effort and to a lesser degree outcome
- Technological regimes (sectoral instruments)
 - Higher opportunity has a negative, and higher appropriability a positive impact on competition



Competition policy

- Further competition is detrimental to innovation at already high levels of competition → antitrust authorities typically not involved!
- Further competition is conducive to innovation at low levels of competition → antitrust measures can raise competition and innovation!

Industrial policy

No-innovation trap' (negative spiral of increasing competition and less to no innovation) → innovation policies for low innovation firms?



Description of the variables

- Endogenous variables
- Control variables
- Instrumental variables
- Additional estimates
 - innovation *production* function
 - innovation impact function
- Simulation of changes in exogenous variables



Endogenous variables

C	Competition	Number of principal competitors in the main product market worldwide;
$\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{i}}$	Competition	subjective firm assessment according to the following ordinal scale:
		1 Number of principal competitors <= 5
		2 Number of principal competitors $> 5 \& \le 15$
		3 Number of principal competitors $> 15 \& \le 50$
		4 Number of principal competitors > 50
O_i	Opportunity type	1 No innovation activity
-		2 External acquisition of new technology
		3 Own R&D, but R&D expenditures less than 5% of total sales
		4 Own R&D, but R&D expenditures > 5% of total sales
E.	Entrepreneurship	1 Adaptive 1 : Pursuing opportunities other than from techn. innov.
1	type	2 Adaptive 2 : introducing new products and/or processes new to their
	J P	firm but not new to the market (Technology adopters)
		3Creative 1: Product and/or process innovator (new to the firm)
		developing the innovation predominantly on their own
		•
		4Creative 2. Introducing products new to the market
		4Creative 2: introducing products new to the market



Control variables

tp_i	Technological potential	Firm's assessment of the technological potential (worldwide
•		available knowledge to further the innovation activities of the firm)
		on a five point Likert-scale (1 low5 great)
k_{i}	Capital intensity	Natural logarithm of revenues (per employee) due to fixed capital (=
		turnover – intermediary products – personnel costs)
hc_i	Human capital	Natural logarithm of average labor cost per employee
g_{i}	Demand growth	Firm's assessment of the demand development during the past 3
o i	<u> </u>	years on a five point Likert-scale (1 strong decline 5 remarkable
		increase)
-0	E	,
$g^e_{\ i}$	Expected demand growth	Firm's assessment of the expected demand development in the
		coming 3 years on a five point Likert-scale (1 strong decline 5
		remarkable increase)
$\overline{S_i}$	Firm size	4 size classes (dummy variables): small (number of employees < 50);
~ l		medium (number of employees $\geq 50 \& < 150$); large (number of
		employees >= 150 & < 250); very large (number of employees >=
		250). Large firms are the reference category in the estimations
$\overline{f_i}$	Foreign ownership	Dummy variable indicating whether a firm is owned by a foreign
·		company
$\overline{e_i}$	Exports	Dummy variables indicating whether a firm has export activities
$\overline{a_i}$	Firm age	Firm age in years



Instrumental variables

Three **taxonomies of technological regimes** based on a sample of 78 thousand firms from **22 European countries** and clustering sectors by relative differences in the distribution of heterogenous firm types (see *Peneder*, 2010). The sectors are classified according to a characteristically high share of firms in Europe (other than Switzerland) with ...

$\overline{\mathit{O}_{j}}$	Opportunity conditions	 neither intramural nor external R&D activities acquisition of external R&D, machinery, rights, etc. own R&D, but less or equal 5% of total sales own R&D, more than 5% of total sales
$\overline{A_j}$	Appropriability conditions	 no appropriation measures appropriation only by secrecy, lead-time, or complexity of design appropriation by design patterns, trademarks, or copyright (with or without strategic methods) appropriation by patents (alone or with either strategic or other formal methods) appropriation by patents together with other formal and strategic methods
$\overline{M_j}$	Cumulativeness of knowledge	1 reporting neither internal nor external knowledge sources of high importance 2 creative firms with internal sources less important than external sources; and/or adaptive firms with internal sources more or equally important 3 creative firms with internal sources more or equally important than external sources; and/or adaptive firms with external sources more important



Innovation production function

Variables	Total sample		Creative regime		Adaptive regime	
	Coef.		Coef.		Coef.	
O_i	1.1137	***	0.5230	***	1.7045	***
•	(0.0788)		(0.0463)		(0.1816)	
tp _i	-0.0369	***	0.0146		-0.0584	***
- 1	(0.0120)		(0.0137)		(0.0177)	
hc _i	-0.0367		-0.0215		-0.0214	
•	(0.0259)		(0.0331)		(0.0387)	
S _i small	0.0567		-0.0422		0.0320	
•	(0.0383)		(0.0459)		(0.0579)	
S _i med	0.1248	***	0.0420		0.0678	
	(0.0370)		(0.0454)		(0.0574)	
S _i very large	0.0685	*	0.1014	**	0.0719	
	(0.0405)		(0.0489)		(0.0655)	
$\overline{\mathrm{M_{i}}}$	-0.0415	*	0.0285	**	-0.2615	***
J	(0.0242)		(0.0127)		(0.0675)	
No Obs.	8,656		4,513		4,143	




Innovation impact function

Independent variables	Total sample		Creative regime		Adaptive regime	
	Coef.		Coef.		Coef.	
$\overline{\mathbf{E_i}}$	-11.1253	***	-9.4710	***	-11.4623	***
	(1.0697)		(0.9133)		(1.7354)	
tp _i	0.7899	***	0.8068	***	0.5803	***
-	(0.1237)		(0.1346)		(0.1493)	
hc _i	-0.0772		0.0545		-0.8527	**
•	(0.2756)		(0.3036)		(0.3756)	
$\mathbf{g}_{\mathbf{i}}$	0.2560	***	0.0692		0.5402	***
•	(0.0827)		(0.0762)		(0.1427)	
$\mathbf{g_{i}^{e}}$	0.9023	***	0.5940	***	0.5817	***
•	(0.1255)		(0.1178)		(0.1683)	
S _i small	-1.7170	***	-1.7254		-1.4122	**
-	(0.4087)		(0.4380)		(0.5616)	
S _i med	-0.2461		-0.8397	**	0.5045	
•	(0.3804)		(0.4123)		(0.5397)	
Si very large	2.1895	***	1.4958	***	2.3099	***
•	(0.4743)		(0.4695)		(0.6990)	
$\overline{\mathbf{A_j}}$	0.9510	***	0.6231	***	2.4258	***
J	(0.1788)		(0.0805)		(0.4047)	
No Obs.	8,656		4,513		4,143	




Change in exogenous variables (4)






Change in exogenous variables (5)






Change in exogenous variables (6)






Change in exogenous variables (7)





Change in exogenous variables (8)





Change in exogenous variables (9)

